What’s Driving the Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?

The Turkish flag flies over an inlet in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. (Flickr/Clive Rogers, https://flic.kr/p/cjcPyY; CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/) On Jan. 25, Turkey and Greece will begin exploratory talks in an effort to resolve the issues at the root of their often hostile relations. This isn’t the second round of talks, or the third, or the fourth—it’s the 61st. Given that tension between the two countries almost led to military confrontation in August 2020, this latest attempt to resolve the conflict is a welcome development. But will it work? The ongoing dispute in the eastern Mediterranean directly involves Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—but it also implicates Egypt, Libya, Israel, Italy, France and Germany. Turkey, Greece and Cyprus are at odds over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and ownership of the associated Mediterranean gas fields. Meanwhile, Israel, Egypt, Greece and other EU member states are concerned that Turkish aggression could undermine a planned pipeline, threatening exporters’ economic potential and importers’ access to gas. And all are concerned about falling behind in the race for regional dominance. These tensions have been exacerbated by other factors shaping Turkey policy in European and Arab states—including security, migration, and domestic politics, as well as a desire to contain Turkey’s regional ambitions.  The clashes in the region have a long history. Following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus—itself in response to a Greek-backed coup—the island was partitioned into the internationally recognized, majority-Greek Republic of Cyprus in the south, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the north. While the former has been an EU member since 2004, the latter is recognized only by Turkey.  Tensions have ratcheted up in recent years as Turkey, Greece and Cyprus have butted heads over rights to exploration and drilling for hydrocarbon resources. In 2011, the American company Noble Energy discovered the Aphrodite gas field in Cyprus’s EEZ, sparking a new round of conflict. The Republic of Cyprus is seeking to assert the right to make its own energy decisions, while Turkey argues that the distribution of Cyprus’s natural resources ought to be negotiated with the TRNC. To this end, Turkey has sent ships into Cypriot waters repeatedly since spring 2019—a move that the European Union met with condemnation and sanctions . Greece, meanwhile, defends its entitlement to exclusive drilling rights over the continental shelves created by each of its many islands in the Aegean Sea. Ankara rejects these claims, arguing that the shelves of the Greek islets impinge on its own EEZ.  In the second half of 2020, tensions between the two NATO allies reached a high. In August, Ankara sent a seismic research vessel to the vicinity of the Greek island of Kastellorizo, not far from Turkey’s western shore, in response to the signing of a maritime accord between Greece and Egypt—itself a response to a Turkish EEZ agreement with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA). On Aug. 12, Greek and Turkish frigates collided in contested waters. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan quickly threatened retaliation . The escalation between Athens and Ankara worried the international community, especially given the recent rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. In a show of solidarity with Athens, French President Emmanuel Macron decided to “ temporarily reinforce ” France’s military presence in the region, while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) sent warplanes to the Greek island of Crete for joint military exercises.  The early fall was quieter. But Turkey began to act aggressively again in October and November 2020, only to back down in advance of a December summit where European leaders voted to impose economic sanctions on Turkey for its actions in the region.  The conflict in the eastern Mediterranean brings together intertwined disputes over energy sources, geopolitical dominance and domestic factors influencing Turkey policy. Taken together, this makes for a highly combustible situation—especially because continued provocations from Turkey, and to a lesser extent other states, have repeatedly exacerbated the situation. A diplomatic solution to competition over hydrocarbon exploration that includes Ankara is the only way forward. Europeans, for their part, need to develop a common policy toward Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, while Middle Eastern states should compartmentalize their disagreement with Turkey on its support for Islamist groups.  Energy Concerns  Disputes in the eastern Mediterranean are animated by a host of underlying conflicts. But in a proximate sense, they are caused largely by disagreements over access to and ownership of energy sources, particularly gas. Access to domestic gas is a ticket to greater influence on the international stage and to economic independence, which significantly shapes the stances of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as those of Egypt and Israel. Both Middle Eastern states have, in fact, recently discovered gas fields off of their own coasts and have ambitions to become energy hubs in the region.  Following the Arab Spring, Egypt faced natural gas shortages , a result of decreased domestic production and increased demand. This, combined with deep cuts in fuel subsidies due to the conditions of an International Monetary Fund loan, has led to low-level political instability in the country. As prices of commodities continue to increase, wages have failed to keep up. Luckily for Egypt, though, there seems to be reason for hope. In 2015, the Italian energy company Eni discovered Zohr gas field in the Mediterranean Sea within Egypt’s EEZ. The gas field contains approximately 30 trillion cubic feet of gas, making it the largest in the eastern Mediterranean thus far. Not only has this find allowed Egypt to slowly decrease its reliance on imports and plan for a more self-sufficient future in terms of energy, but it also presents a significant export opportunity for Cairo.  Egypt possesses two liquefaction facilities, though only one is currently in operation. These facilities convert natural gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG), making it easier to ship. Given Egypt’s central location, the state can act as both an exporter and a reexporter of LNG. The opportunities for reexport include a potential Cyprus-Egypt pipeline , through which Cyprus would export gas from the Aphrodite gas field to Egypt for liquefaction and Egypt would then reexport LNG to the European market. Turkey, however, insists that revenue from Aphrodite must be shared with the TNRC. But regardless, for Egypt’s struggling economy, export opportunities like this pipeline and its recent gas finds are a lifeline and a way to reestablish itself as a regional power.  If Turkey continues on a path of belligerence in the Mediterranean, this could compromise Egypt’s emergence. Egypt can ill afford that—and, as a result, has made clear that it stands with Greece and with general eastern Mediterranean cooperation through initiatives like the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), an intergovernmental organization that serves as a platform for organizing the exploitation and sale of energy resources in the region.  Israel is also aiming to become a major energy exporter in the eastern Mediterranean. The Leviathan gas field, discovered in 2010, and the Tamar gas field, discovered in 2009—both in Israel’s EEZ—have been central to the country’s pursuit of that goal. For the first time since the Leviathan gas field’s discovery, gas from the field was exported to Egypt and Jordan in 2020. ( Lebanon and Israel have conflicting maritime claims, the resolution of which would add Lebanon as another potential producer of offshore gas reserves.) More important yet for Israel is the proposed EastMed pipeline , which would export Israeli and Cypriot gas to Greece and then on to Europe. The proposed pipeline is expected to be completed in 2025, though it would need to pass through Turkey’s purported EEZ—as established in Turkey’s November 2019 agreement with the Libyan GNA. This accord recognizes Libya’s and Turkey’s EEZs as extending across the Mediterranean through what Greece and Cyprus consider their EEZs and ignores the presence of the Greek islands of Crete and Rhodes . While no other countries recognize the boundaries set by Turkey and Libya, the accord may still present obstacles to the EastMed pipeline. Permissions for the pipeline must come from the countries whose EEZs it would pass through, and if Turkey asserts itself, it could block efforts to move forward with building the pipeline.    Ankara, for its part, recognize
What’s Driving the Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean? posted first on http://realempcol.tumblr.com/rss