What Will It Take for Pakistan to Pressure the Taliban Into a Cease-Fire?

An Afghan army bomb disposal team neutralizes a roadside IED in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, 2012. (Al Jazeera English, https://www.flickr.com/photos/32834977@N03/8157192867; CC BY-SA 2.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/) In Afghanistan, surging violence has worsened the sluggish pace of peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, jeopardizing a potential settlement to end the country’s decades of war. Reducing the bloodshed is a necessary step toward building trust for ongoing negotiations — a fact complicated by the fact that the Taliban view fighting as their primary source of leverage over the Afghan government .  Pakistan — by virtue of its long-standing relationship with the Taliban and their senior leaders, many of whom have resided within its borders — is arguably best positioned to persuade the Taliban to dial back the violence. But Islamabad is playing a game of chicken with Washington by pretending it cannot exert additional pressure over the Taliban. If the Biden administration wants any chance at persuading Pakistan to push the Taliban to reduce violence, then it is going to have to act quickly and make some tough decisions.  Pakistan helped to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table in Doha but stopped there. Rather than pushing the Taliban for an outright reduction in use of force, Islamabad has instead opted to tacitly support the Taliban’s bargaining position to enter into a cease-fire only on certain conditions: further concessions by Kabul and the departure of U.S. troops.  The country’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, recently said as much during a Jan. 26 phone call, when he told his Afghan counterpart that pushing talks forward would “facilitate [a] reduction in violence, leading to [a] ceasefire.” On Jan. 21, Khan’s adviser, Moeed Yusuf, reiterated that “Pakistan in itself can’t get a [Taliban] ceasefire.” This statement echoes previous claims that Pakistan could not convince the Taliban to negotiate with Kabul. So long as negotiations continue and U.S. troop levels do not increase, Islamabad may believe it is sitting pretty, regardless of the violence Afghans face.  There are several reasons why Pakistan may not want to pressure the Taliban further. For one, Islamabad is sensitive to what it characterizes as years of thankless pressure by Washington to “do more.” It avers that its influence over the Taliban was reduced by the appointment of hardliner Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai as the Taliban’s chief negotiator to vigorously tow the line of Taliban chief Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and the group’s military commission, neither of which is ready to stop fighting. Some analysts agree with this assessment.  Islamabad also claims it has avoided taking a more coercive approach for fear that such action could have serious domestic security consequences — the Afghan Taliban could turn their guns on Pakistan by partnering with Pakistan’s own violent extremists, including sectarian groups and the Pakistani Taliban, formally known as the Tehreek-e-Taliban. And it is widely assumed in Western reporting that parts of Pakistan’s military establishment share sympathies for the Taliban’s struggle, another factor that potentially complicates Islamabad’s willingness to pressure the group. But the Pakistani public generally opposes the group, and diplomatic ties are waning too.  Despite Islamabad’s hesitations, the prevailing view in Washington is that by bringing the Taliban to the table without convincing them to reduce violence, Pakistan sold the Trump administration a car without an engine.  Of course, changing the status quo is not easy. Replicating the failed “maximum pressure” campaign used on Iran, as some proposals suggest, would be a grave U.S. error in Pakistan. Too much pressure, such as threats to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism if the government does not sufficiently attempt to coerce the Taliban to tone down violence, not only would be a policy of questionable proportionality but also would lead Islamabad to dig in its heels. By contrast, a no-strings-attached “ strategic love and affection ” would end in free-riding. Instead, the Biden administration must use its leverage carefully. The U.S. should engage in messaging that is firm, results oriented, and clear about the specific consequences that Pakistan will face at various levels of cooperation with the Taliban.  Policy proposals to offer the Afghan peace process breathing room by negotiating a one-time extension of the U.S. withdrawal deadline admittedly rely on buy-in from Pakistan. These proposals invariably run through Pakistan, making the barriers to success high without significant compromises that Washington may be unwilling to make. These include offering relief from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), drawing red lines for India in Afghanistan, and prioritizing an end to the war over other regional objectives. Pakistan’s help in reducing Taliban violence is far from guaranteed, but the following steps offer the greatest likelihood of success.  1. Offer Support at the Financial Action Task Force If Pakistan Curbs Taliban Violence Escaping the crosshairs of the FATF “grey list” would offer a significant political win for Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and the military, which makes it a source of leverage for Washington.  The FATF was established by the G-7 as an intergovernmental watchdog to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2018, the watchdog placed Pakistan on its grey list, a move that has incurred political rather than economic costs for the country. Pakistan’s economy is undoubtedly floundering — but this is not due to the listing. Indeed, the FATF designation is not a significant source of harm to the country’s economy. Nonetheless, the 2018 listing has still done political damage by putting Islamabad’s isolation on full display, with even Saudi Arabia and China declining to advocate for the country.  The FATF designation also puts the looming threat of the “black list” on the horizon. A blacklisting would prevent Pakistan from receiving crucial assistance from institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank. Simply stated, the threat of economic harm from the FATF remains very much on the table. Washington was behind the 2018 motion to place Pakistan back on the FATF grey list after its previous removal in 2015. In addition to Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani Network, the move was motivated largely by Islamabad’s continued tolerance of anti-India terrorists, a tacit support that some experts feared could spark a nuclear conflict with India. The 2016 terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Uri and the 2017 decision by the Lahore High Court to release U.N.-designated terrorist Hafiz Saeed set the stage for the U.S. action, and the 2019 terrorist attack on a paramilitary convoy in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir only solidified Washington’s view that Pakistan must be punished. Pakistan has since sentenced Saeed to 15 years in prison and taken significant steps toward FATF compliance. But when it comes to changing Pakistan’s mind about using non-state actors against India, some former U.S. officials assert that “neither the United States nor India has the tools to fundamentally alter, in the near term, what has been a long-standing attribute of Pakistan’s foreign policy.”  In other words, Pakistan might be willing to crank up the pressure on the Taliban to get back in the good graces of the FATF. The greylisting of Pakistan may have generated some actions against figures like Saeed, but the U.S. shouldn’t expect FATF leverage to buy a full-scale reversal of Pakistan’s implicit support for anti-India groups. For this reason, Washington should instead prioritize using FATF leverage to improve conditions in Afghanistan.  With this incentive, Washington may be able to convince Pakistan to exert more pressure on the Taliban. To coerce another country into altering its position , “ a government must generally clearly communicate its objectives[] [and] impose costs that outweigh the benefits the other nation gets from standing firm[.]” Such coercion is not impossible, as was demonstrated by the U.S.-Taliban agreement forged in 2020 — all of this to say, the U.S. should clearly communicate its willingness to offer conditional support for Pakistan at the FATF.  If Pakistan manages to reduce violence in Afghanistan, thereby clearing the way for the Taliban’s transition from a militant group to a political actor, then it deserves Washington’s support at the FATF. Alternatively, if Pakistan refuses to take action, then it should remain on the list. If further progress is made, then options like releasing money from the Coalition Support Fund may be considered so long as it is conditioned on specific results-oriented actions on the part of Pakistan. Pakistan will face
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