Thursday, March 25, 2021

Making Sense of Iran and al-Qaeda’s Relationship

Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers remarks on Iran and al-Qaeda's relationship in Washington, DC, on Jan. 12, 2021. Photo Credit: State Department photo by Freddie Everett via Flickr. Editor’s Note: Al-Qaeda and Iran are strange bedfellows. Iran’s allies and proxies are often at war with al-Qaeda affiliates, but at the same time Iran hosts senior al-Qaeda leaders. Colin Clarke of The Soufan Group and Stanford’s Asfandyar Mir unpack this odd relationship, tracing its history and identifying the advantages for Tehran and al-Qaeda. Daniel Byman *** The nature of the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is one of the most contentious debates in the counterterrorism community, dividing analysts , policymakers and government officials . The stakes of establishing or disproving the relationship are considerable—meaningful state support is immensely useful to terrorist organizations, especially one being hunted by the U.S. government. Current analytic disagreements are not necessarily about whether al-Qaeda and Iran have a relationship; on that point, there is little room for doubt. But some observers argue that ideological differences and deep distrust affect the relationship to the point that it is little more than an “insurance policy” for both sides. Others swing to the opposite extreme, arguing the relationship is more akin to a deep, strategic partnership . Still others argue that the relationship is mostly tactical and falls well short of having any strategic value. It is important to frame the relationship in its historical context with attention to its trajectory and political implications. Such an analysis suggests that al-Qaeda and Iran’s relationship has overcome conflict to generate strategic benefits to both actors.   Al-Qaeda and Iran’s Ties Under bin Laden   The relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is neither novel nor recent; on the contrary, it is well documented through a combination of publicly available U.S. intelligence assessments , declassified al-Qaeda documents and their detailed analysis , statements and clarifications by al-Qaeda’s own leadership, and interview-based historiography . Taken together, these materials are rich and informative on the granularities of their interaction as well as on broader political questions. The overall picture that emerges is that Iran provided critical life support to al-Qaeda, especially in times of crisis for the organization, but Iranian help came with numerous strings attached. For its part, al-Qaeda has become less ambivalent about its levels of both cooperation and conflict with Iran. The roots of the relationship can be traced to the early 1990s. At the time, al-Qaeda and Iran struck a pact that included al-Qaeda members training with Iranian intelligence operatives in Iran and Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. In the mid-1990s, after al-Qaeda moved from Sudan to Afghanistan, Iran provided al-Qaeda operatives logistical and travel support. As per the 9/11 Commission Report , “Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and … some of these were future 9/11 hijackers.” Immediately after 9/11, Iran offered to open its borders for Arab fighters wanting to travel to Afghanistan. Following 9/11, bin Laden’s emissaries Mustafa Hamid and Abu Hafs al-Mauritani were able to negotiate a deal with Iranian authorities. (Hamid has denied being sent by al-Qaeda.) Iran provided al-Qaeda with a passageway for its fighters fleeing Afghanistan to return to their respective countries or to move on to third-party countries. Iran also provided a permissive sanctuary for al-Qaeda leaders and their families within its borders. Amid America’s intensifying worldwide counterterrorism campaign, the Iranian sanctuary enabled al-Qaeda to constitute a military council and revive important operations , though it remains unclear to what extent this facilitated al-Qaeda’s broader international terrorism campaign. By 2003, the relationship had grown turbulent. Iran cracked down on al-Qaeda’s presence in the country. Al-Qaeda’s top leadership in Iran was moved into the controlled custody of Iranian intelligence. As per Hamid, Iran “arrested or deported around 98 percent” of Arab fighters, and according to top al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel, Iranian authorities “foiled 75% of [al-Qaeda] plans.” The reasons for this break are not clear from the available materials. One possible explanation is that Tehran grew perturbed by al-Qaeda’s expanding footprint in the country, which al-Qaeda operatives made little effort to conceal and which drew unwanted attention to the Iranian regime. Another possibility is that Iran was acting in support of the brief 2002 U.S.-Iran rapprochement, though that was soon scuttled. The U.S. invasion of Iraq created valuable incentives for al-Qaeda and Iran to form an alliance, but there was no meaningful shift in cooperation between the two. Instead, sporadic low-level hostilities, occasional tactical adjustments, and constant bargaining persisted. For instance, al-Qaeda in Iraq’s anti-Shiite campaign prompted Iran to approach al-Qaeda’s top leadership for security of Shiite sites in Iraq as well as the possibility of broader cooperation. In response, bin Laden sought accommodation for al-Qaeda militants in Iran in exchange for discussion of al-Qaeda’s overall strategy in Iraq. Some level of accommodation appears to have been secured during these years, facilitating a growing logistical role of Iranian territory for transiting fighters to Waziristan. Iran began easing some restrictions on al-Qaeda by 2007. Senior al-Qaeda leadership entrenched in Waziristan came to view Iran as a crucial passageway for “funds, personnel, and communication,” especially as U.S. drone strikes intensified. According to journalists Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, even reached out to al-Qaeda leadership and their families and had “regular discussions” with Saif al-Adel; in one instance, Soleimani “turned up in person” to celebrate Eid with bin Laden’s sons. Yet there remained restrictions on the leadership and their families—an issue that caused bitterness among bin Laden and his senior lieutenants. This led al-Qaeda to kidnap an Iranian diplomat in Pakistan in November 2008. Through 2009, complex bargaining between al-Qaeda and Iran ensued with ample confusion and misperception about the release of prisoners. At one point in late 2009, Iran expressed interest in learning about al-Qaeda’s strategy. By 2010—through hard diplomacy, including the release of the Iranian diplomat, assurances of nonaggression, and threats of ratcheting up anti-Iran rhetoric—al-Qaeda successfully secured the release of key members and their families in detention.   Cooperation and Conflict After bin Laden   By the time of bin Laden’s killing in May 2011, al-Qaeda’s relationship with Iran had grown less cumbersome along tactical and, to an extent, strategic lines. For one, Iran began to formalize a logistics infrastructure for the group, with active transit facilitation for its leaders, members and recruits. This significant improvement in ties was observed by the U.S. government in 2011. Then-Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence and current Deputy CIA Director David Cohen described it as “Iran’s secret deal with al-Qa’ida,” and the following year the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Iran’s Ministry of Internal Security for providing documents, identification cards and passports to al-Qaeda. In 2013, Canadian police thwarted a terrorism plot linked to al-Qaeda operatives in Iran . The improved transit facilitation in Iran did not preclude conflict. Both sides continued to jockey for leverage. Iran sought to coerce al-Qaeda by detaining key leaders and operatives, which frustrated al-Qaeda’s leadership. In 2013, al-Qaeda kidnapped an Iranian diplomat in Yemen, and tensions escalated further when al-Qaeda carried out a bomb attack at the home of the Iranian ambassador in Yemen in 2014. In 2015, Iran released six al-Qaeda leaders, including Abu al-Khayr al-Masri, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, Saif al-Adel , and Abu al-Qassam, in exchange for the kidnapped Iranian diplomat . Abu al-Khayr and three others traveled to Syria, where al-Qaeda’s local leadership was publicly distancing itself from al-Qaeda’s anti-U.S. agenda to prioritize its campaign against the Iran-backed Assad regime. The remaining al-Qaeda leadership in Iran was able to finesse more latitude to operate and to participate in major political decisions. Analyst Cole Bunzel observes that in the discussion over the future of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, which proceeded to break away from al-Qaeda, Abu al-Qassam noted that their Iran-based leaders were important to the group’s direction and that they were not in detention but were restricted from traveling out of Iran. As per U.S. reporting in 2016, Iran continued to allow al-Qaeda’s organization to move money via Iran, as well as to shuttl
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